Nigeria’s creative industries contribute significantly to the economy, but have long suffered from high levels of piracy and rights infringement. In a decisive move to strengthen the legal and institutional framework for copyright protection, the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) has recently introduced two landmark initiatives. These developments signal a renewed and strategic commitment to the enforcement and management of intellectual property (IP) rights in Nigeria.
First, by order of the Attorney-General, the NCC was designated a “relevant organisation” under the Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act, 2022 (“POCA”), enabling it to trace and seize the proceeds of copyright crime. Second, on 28 January 2025 the NCC issued the Copyright (Collective Management) Regulations, 2025 (“CMR, 2025”), under its statutory power (Copyright Act 2022 s.88(6)(c)), repealing the old 2007 CMO rules and vastly strengthening governance of collecting societies. These developments promise to bolster enforcement and transparency. This article explains the new mandates, analyzes their practical impact, compares them to international norms, examines sector-specific effects, and offers recommendations for implementation.
NCC AS A “RELEVANT ORGANISATION” UNDER POCA 2022
The Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act 2022 (POCA) establishes a regime for forfeiting and managing assets derived from crime. POCA defines a “relevant organisation” as certain enforcement agencies (EFCC, ICPC, NDLEA, etc.) and “…such other organisations as the Attorney-General may designate”. In 2025, the Attorney-General formally added the NCC to this list by issuing the Proceeds of Crime (Designation of Nigerian Copyright Commission as a Relevant Organization) Order, 2025. As Director-General John Asein explained in a twitter post announcing the gazetted instruments,, this move empowers the NCC to “follow the money” in copyright piracy cases.
As a relevant organisation, the NCC now has access to POCA’s asset-recovery toolbox. For example, Section 3 of POCA requires that “the relevant organisation shall… enforce and administer the provisions of this Act” and establish a specialized Proceeds of Crime (Management) Directorate for handling seized assets. In practice, this means the NCC can execute contracts with asset managers, auctioneers or forensic accountants to track and monetize illicit gains from piracy. Crucially, under Section 9, the relevant organisation may seek preservation orders (ex parte freezing orders) over any property “reasonably suspected to have been derived from unlawful activities”. With a preservation order, NCC can restrain suspects from selling or hiding assets (bank accounts, real estate, vehicles, etc.) before trial. If a forfeiture order is later granted, Section 5(2) of POCA vests the confiscated property in the relevant organisation “for and on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria”.
In short, NCC can now use POCA to apply to the High Court to freeze and seize the proceeds of copyright offenses. For example, in an online piracy ring that earns advertising revenue, the NCC could trace those funds and apply to confiscate them under POCA. Similarly, organizers of illicit markets for pirated DVDs or unlicensed software face having their business assets and revenues targeted. The NCC’s Proceeds of Crime Directorate (to be established) will maintain an inventory of seized assets and may even appoint receivers to operate businesses until litigation is resolved. These are new powers: previously, the NCC could seek injunctions or fines under the Copyright Act, but could not independently freeze assets or manage forfeitures.
Internationally, using anti-money-laundering (AML) laws to combat IP crime is increasingly common. In the UK, for example, copyright and trademark offenders may face asset confiscation under the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if convicted of criminal infringement. The UK’s Serious Fraud Office and National Crime Agency routinely apply AML tools to piracy (and indeed consider counterfeiting an “organised crime” issue). In the US, federal prosecutors use statutes like the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and criminal forfeiture provisions of the DMCA (17 U.S.C. § 506, § 2318) to seize assets of major copyright violators. South Africa’s Prevention of Organised Crime Act similarly allows forfeiture of proceeds from any serious offence, including copyright crimes. By contrast, until now Nigeria’s NCC was outside the asset-forfeiture framework. The new designation brings Nigerian law enforcement closer to global practice: the NCC can now cooperate with other AML agencies (EFCC, NDLEA, etc.) and even foreign partners under mutual legal assistance treaties.
For rights holders and the NCC, this is significant. It means that instead of only pursuing infringers in civil or criminal courts, the NCC can now investigate the financial trails of piracy and seek civil non-conviction-based forfeiture orders under POCA Part IV. This power applies even without a criminal conviction, provided the court is satisfied the assets are tied to unlawful activity. In effect, the NCC gains a “follow the money” tool to tackle online piracy and large-scale bootlegging. Importantly, to be effective, the NCC must build capacity in financial investigation and AML compliance – it must train officers to gather bank records, trace electronic payments, and work with prosecutors. Coordination with the Attorney-General’s office is essential, since POCA orders are issued by the courts on the AG’s application. The NCC’s inclusion also strengthens inter-agency collaboration: the Commission can now formally share intelligence with EFCC, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, and international counterparts.
In summary, under POCA the NCC’s key new powers include:
Applying for preservation orders to freeze suspected proceeds (assets, accounts, domains) pending court determination.
Enforcing court forfeiture orders, so that confiscated assets are vested in the NCC for public use.
Establishing a Proceeds of Crime Directorate within the NCC, responsible for asset management, inventory of seized property, appointing asset managers, and compiling statistics on recoveries.
Collaborating with other agencies and courts to trace cross-border pirate networks and repatriate assets.
These powers, long used against drug and corruption offenders in Nigeria, are now explicitly available for copyright enforcement. Rights owners should be prepared to assist by documenting the financial harm of piracy (sales losses, etc.) and working with the NCC’s investigators.
On January 28, 2025, the NCC promulgated the Copyright (Collective Management) Regulations, 2025 (CMR 2025). These Regulations – issued under Section 88(6)(c) of the Copyright Act 2022 – repeal the old 2007 CMO rules and set detailed standards for how Collective Management Organisations (CMOs) must operate. The NCC emphasizes that the CMR “promises transparency, accountability, and good governance” among CMOs. In broad terms, the CMR require every CMO to be formally licensed by the NCC and to follow strict internal governance, financial and reporting rules. Key features include:
Objectives and Functions (Regulations 1–2): Each CMO must operate “in the interest of its members” (copyright owners) and pursue core functions such as licensing, royalty collection and distribution, and assisting rights enforcement. These statutory functions (monitoring uses, negotiating licences, collecting and paying royalties, etc.) now have express legal backing.
Approval and Renewal (Regs 3–5): No group may act as a CMO without NCC approval. To register, a CMO must be a company limited by guarantee with appropriate governance structures and consent of at least 100 rights owners in the relevant category. Initial NCC approval lasts 5 years, renewable every 3 years on re-application.
Membership and Rights (Regs 6–11): A right owner may join any CMO that has been approved to manage that category of work. Crucially, owners can assign rights to multiple CMOs, provided no conflicting licences are granted in the same territory. Under the CMR, members must have a voice: CMOs are obliged to adopt internal rules allowing members to vote, hold office on governing boards, and participate in general meetings. This contrasts with past practice where some CMOs operated with little input from the artists or authors they serve.
Fair Treatment of Non-Members: The Regulations explicitly recognize “opt-out non-members” – creators whose works are managed by a CMO without formal membership. A non-member can issue an opt-out notice, after which the CMO must inform licensees and terminate non-member licences at year-end. (This partially addresses concerns raised by analysts that non-members had no redress in the old system.)
Tariff-Setting and Licensing (Reg 15): CMOs must set licensing tariffs transparently. In doing so, they must consider objective criteria (commercial value, scope of use, etc.) and submit proposals to the NCC for approval. If a licensee cannot use a purchased license due to CMO fault, the CMO must refund the fee.
Financial Management (Regs 20–24): CMOs must maintain separate bank accounts for (i) royalty collections (member distributions), (ii) “holding accounts” for unallocated funds, and (iii) any other income. The holding account is used to park royalties that cannot be immediately distributed (e.g. owner untraceable). Funds in the holding account must be held for at least 7 years; any undistributed balance after 7 years shall “fall into the general revenue of the CMO for distribution”. Each CMO must publish annual financial reports audited by independent accountants. The NCC is empowered to audit a CMO’s finances whenever there are allegations of impropriety.
Governance and Conflict of Interest (Regs 17–19, 24–28): CMOs must hold annual general meetings and have a board with balanced representation of member categories. The Regulations impose strict internal controls: e.g. the board cannot include the CMO’s CEO, and no board member may serve more than 8 years. CMOs must adopt conflict-of-interest policies for officers. They must also establish an internal dispute resolution panel to handle member or user complaints (no cumbersome court action) and maintain confidentiality of owner data.
Sanctions and Enforcement (Regs 30–32): If a CMO violates the Regulations or fails to comply with an NCC directive, the NCC may issue compliance notices and ultimately suspend or revoke the CMO’s license. Non-compliant CMO officers face fines or other penalties. These measures provide teeth to NCC oversight.
In sum, the CMR introduce one of the world’s most detailed collective-management codes. They go well beyond the 2007 rules by codifying member rights, conflict rules, and modern financial practices. Rights owners benefit from clearer transparency and the ability to challenge CMOs through internal panels. For CMOs, the path to approval is more stringent (board structure, member sign-ups, capital, etc.), but once licensed they enjoy formal recognition and protection under law. The CMR explicitly aim to close the “accountability gap” that critics warned about by making CMOs fully answerable to both members and the Commission.
These changes align Nigeria with leading practices. For example, the EU’s Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU), implemented in the UK by regulations, similarly mandates governance codes, audit, and member voting for CMOs. The UK Intellectual Property Office monitors CMO compliance and publishes enforcement reports. South Africa’s recent Copyright Amendment laws introduced a monopoly model (one collecting society per right) – a different approach to assure control. Nigeria’s regime still allows multiple CMOs per category (subject to NCC approval) but clamps down on unfair practices. On balance, the CMR 2025 bring Nigeria closer to the transparency standards found in EU and UK law, while tailored to the local context.
SECTOR SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS
Music: Nigeria has a vibrant music industry, and CMOs like COSON (Copyright Society of Nigeria) manage song licensing. Under CMR 2025, COSON and any new music CMOs must formalize their member processes and accounts. Musicians can now demand voter rights and financial reports from their society. The CMR’s holding account rule is crucial: royalties for obscure or diaspora artists must be tracked for 7 years. NCC oversight means COSON’s tariffs (e.g. for concerts or radio play) will be reviewed by the regulator, reducing potential abuse. Enforcement-wise, the NCC’s POCA powers allow it to pursue large-scale music pirates. For instance, organized distributors of bootleg CDs (a major problem) could have their press machines or sales revenue seized under the new regime.
Film: Nigeria’s film industry (Nollywood) historically relies on piracy crackdowns and enforcement through the Video Rights law. Collective licensing in film is less developed, but filmmakers now have recourse: if a CMO for cinematograph rights emerges, it must follow the CMR. Meanwhile, NCC’s new AML powers can target cinema and DVD pirates. For example, a syndicate selling pirated movies in the market or online could be hit by asset freezes; revenue from streaming piracy could be redirected as lawful compensation to studios.
Across all sectors, rights holders should adapt contracts and practices. For example, artists should ensure their agreements allow joining CMOs as preferred and that opt-out provisions are handled transparently. Users (broadcasters, event organizers, etc.) will see a more predictable licensing environment: tariffs set on published criteria, with remedies if a CMO mischarges. And everyone should note the new “notice to comply” mechanism: users who receive infringement warnings from CMOs may have a streamlined path to resolve disputes through the NCC’s appointed panel (Reg 26), avoiding clogged courts.
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND CONSIDERATIONS
While the new laws are robust on paper, practical success will depend on effective implementation:
Institutional Capacity: The NCC must rapidly build its Proceeds of Crime Directorate and train staff in financial investigations and asset management. This is a technical field requiring forensic accounting and legal coordination. The NCC will need clear guidelines and likely legislative support (e.g. budgets, interagency protocols) to operate effectively as an asset-recovery agency.
Judicial Familiarity: Nigerian judges and prosecutors have limited experience with IP-linked forfeiture orders. The NCC may need to sensitise the judiciary on the nexus between piracy and “unlawful activity” under POCA. Ensuring that courts view large-scale copyright infringement as fitting POCA’s ambit will be vital. Precedents and training seminars may be required.
Data and Documentation: POCA recoveries demand evidence of “proceeds”. Rights holders should assist the NCC by compiling robust data on piracy losses and tracing profit flows (ad revenues, sales receipts, etc.). Similarly, under CMR, CMOs must develop member databases, distribution rules and accounting systems. Smaller or informal CMOs may struggle to upgrade. NCC should publish clear templates (for CMO accounts, reports, complaints forms) to ease transition.
Stakeholder Buy-In: Some creators and CMOs might resist changes. For instance, existing CMOs accustomed to private governance may chafe at NCC oversight or at the cost of compliance (audits, meetings, etc.). The NCC should engage stakeholders through workshops, explaining that transparent CMOs attract more trust (and membership dues). The transitional provision (Reg.33) requires all “existing CMOs” to reapply under the new regs; handling these transitions smoothly will be key to avoid legal limbo.
Overlap with Other Laws: Enforcement of online piracy often implicates telecom or cybercrime statutes. The NCC’s new roles must be coordinated with SON (for media devices), telecom regulators, and law enforcement (police, NDLEA, EFCC). Inter-agency task forces – much like those used against financial crimes – may be needed. Fortunately, POCA itself envisages cooperation among all relevant agencies.
Monitoring Non-Member Interests: Critics have noted that the CMR improve transparency for CMO members but still offer only minimal protections to non-member creators. In practice, disputes can arise if a CMO licenses a work without the author’s knowledge. The “opt-out” rules help, but the NCC may face calls to further refine protections (for example, allowing non-members to access CMO audits or contest certain allocations).
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the NCC (Regulator): Allocate dedicated funding and personnel to asset-recovery functions. Develop standard operating procedures (e.g. POCA case workflows, liaison with EFCC). Issue public guidance and training to judges and prosecutors on Section 9 preservation orders. Proactively identify major piracy targets (streaming sites, markets) and launch pilot asset-tracing cases to set precedents. For CMOs, publish explanatory guidelines, licensing forms and template codes of governance to assist compliance. Organize stakeholder outreach (as NCC has done in WIPO workshops) to explain rights under the CMR. Importantly, NCC should commit to regular reporting on enforcement outcomes (e.g. number of preservation orders sought, assets frozen, CMO audits performed) to build public confidence.
For Rights Holders and CMOs: Musicians, filmmakers, publishers and software developers should update their rights management strategies. Join or form CMOs where helpful, taking advantage of the right to appoint multiple collecting agents. Insist on formal CMO governance: demand voting rights, board representation, and clear royalty policies. Keep meticulous records of licence grants and allegations of infringement – these will underpin POCA filings. If hurt by piracy, work with the NCC’s investigators to quantify and document the proceeds to be seized. Additionally, rights holders might consider diversifying licensing (digital platforms) to reduce reliance on opaque CMO systems.
For Users and Licensees: Media companies, venues, broadcasters, and educators should adapt to the new system by engaging authorized CMOs. The updated tariff-setting process under the CMR means license fees should be justifiable; users can challenge unreasonable rates through the new dispute panel. Note that the CMR and POCA combined increase risk of sanctions for unauthorized use: practitioners (e.g. event promoters, ISPs) must tighten IP compliance and be prepared to obtain proper licenses. On a positive note, more transparent CMO operations may simplify collective licensing in the long run, reducing grey-market dealings.
International Cooperation: Given piracy’s cross-border nature, Nigeria should leverage WIPO and bilateral treaties to chase offshore infringers. For example, if a streaming platform domiciled abroad illegally serves Nigerians, Nigerian courts (with foreign help) could use POCA or civil forfeiture in the host country. Nigeria may look to UK- and U.S.-style mutual legal assistance to freeze foreign accounts and repatriate assets to victims.
In conclusion, the NCC’s new mandates mark a substantial shift in Nigeria’s copyright enforcement landscape. If fully implemented, they could significantly raise the costs of piracy by depriving infringers of profits and by improving trust in collective licensing. The ultimate success will depend on building institutional muscle and stakeholder engagement, but these reforms bring Nigeria’s copyright system in line with international best practices in governance and enforcement.
References
Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act, 2022 (POCA) – Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
Copyright Act, 2022 – Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
Copyright (Collective Management) Regulations, 2025 – Nigerian Copyright Commission.
Proceeds of Crime (Designation of Nigerian Copyright Commission as a Relevant Organisation) Order, 2025
British Parliament (2002). Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002 (UK).
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contentsU.S. Copyright Law (17 U.S.C. ( 506), (2318) and RICO (18 U.S.C. ( 1961) et seq.).
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscodeSouth African Parliament. Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (POCA SA).